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IOLA* & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
THE SHADOW OF WASHINGTON LEGAL
FOUNDATION v. TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE FOUNDATION*
Gerald A. Gordon***
The Court declines to address the expressed social,
political or public policy concerns related to the current
operational procedures of the Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation as it administers the [IOLA Program.'
This decision is an important one because it contradicts
every other court in the country that has addressed this
issue, including two of our sister circuits and a large
number of state appellate courts. . . . [T]his case poses an
unwarranted threat to a primary source of funding for
public interest legal organizations in this circuit at a time
when these organizations are already struggling for their
lives financially.2
* In New York, the subject program of this Comment is called IOLA,
Interest on Lawyers' Accounts. Other jurisdictions refer to this program as
IOLTA, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, or IOTA, Interest on Trust
Accounts. Hereinafter, all such programs will be referred to as "IOLA"
regardless of the individual states' actual acronym.
94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter WLF].
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.A. Bucknell University, 1994.
Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F.
Supp. 1, 11 (W.D. Tex. 1995) [hereinafter Washington Legal Found.].
2 Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 106
F.3d 640, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1997) (Benavides, J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
The Preamble to the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") states that "[a]
lawyer should be mindful ... of the fact that the poor, and
sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal
assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic
influence on their behalf."3  Similarly, the New York State Bar
Association's ("NYSBA") Code of Professional Responsibility
("CPR") states that "every person in our society should have ready
access to the ... professional services of a lawyer ..
Working to provide legal services to all members of society, almost
every state has adopted an IOLA program. 5
The New York State IOLA program6 was created to manage
' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997).
4 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1996).
Hereinafter, the ABA's MRPC and NYSBA's CPR are to collectively be called
the "Professional Codes."
' IOLA programs exist in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Risa I.
Sackmary, Comment, IOLTA's Last Obstacle. Washington Legal Found. v.
Massachusetts Bar Found.'s Faulty Analysis of Attorneys' First Amendment
Rights, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 187, 189 (1994). The remaining hold-out state is Indiana
which has "consistently refus[ed] to accept" an IOLA program. Id. See infra note
55 for a list of these IOLA programs.
6 The IOLA program discussed in this Comment is the New York State
program. Any other state's program will be expressly stated as such.
The New York State IOLA program was created to combat the lack of
availability of "civil legal services to poor persons [which is considered] essential
to the due administration of justice." Legislative Findings and Declaration, N.Y.
STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v (McKinney 1997). The purpose of the program is to
provide "funding for providers of civil legal services in order to ensure effective
access to the judicial system for all citizens of the state to the extent practicable
within the means available for that purpose." Id. The IOLA program established
an IOLA fund to
receive funds from any source for disbursement to nonprofit legal
services providers for charitable purposes .... The IOLA fund will
receive the interest earned by qualified client funds held by attorneys
in unsegregated interest-bearing accounts designated IOLA accounts.
Funds which qualify for deposit in IOLA accounts are those which...
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interest generated from trust funds containing clients' money that
do not justify investment for the benefit of a client because they are
either: 1) of a nominal amount or 2) held for a short period of
time.7 While these funds may not justify investment, it does not
preclude the trust account's ability to earn interest. Under the IOLA
program, interest generated on these accounts is distributed to "not-
for-profit ... entities for the purpose of delivering civil legal
services to the poor.",8 The goal is to provide "civil legal services
attorneys do not deposit in segregated accounts because insufficient
interest would be earned to justify the expense of administration. When
pooled in an IOLA account, funds which would be unproductive as
individual accounts will generate income, the beneficial interest in
which will be held by the IOLA fund exclusively for charitable
purposes.
Id.
' See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (McKinney 1997) (explaining that "'[q]ualified
funds' are moneys" that are "too small in amount or are reasonably expected to
be held for too short a time to generate sufficient interest income to justify the
expense of administering a segregated account for the benefit of the client or
beneficial owner" and are therefore able to be a part of the IOLA program);
Betsy Borden Johnson, Comment, "With Liberty and Justice For All" IOLTA in
Texas - The Texas Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725, 726
(1985) (asserting that funds that are nominal in amount or held for a short period
of time do not justify investment because the amount of interest generated will
not produce enough funds to cover the cost of maintaining the account and
therefore will not benefit the client by producing income).
I N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v (McKinney 1997). In 1995, the New York
State IOLA program generated $8.8 million, the second largest IOLA fund in the
United States. Jill Schachner Chanen, Not With My Money You Don't:
Conservative Group Tries to Shut Down Lawyer Trust Account Payouts, A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1997, at 42.
"No less than [75%]" of the generated funds will be distributed to non-profit
organizations that deliver civil legal services to the poor. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW
§ 97-v(3)(b). The remaining 25% of the funds are to be used to improve the
"administration of justice" which includes "the provision of civil legal services
to groups currently under served by legal services, such as the elderly and the
disabled, and the enhancement of civil legal services to the poor through
innovative and cost-effective means, such as volunteer lawyer programs and
support and training services." N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v(3)(c).
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to groups currently underserved by legal services" and to enhance
"civil legal services to the poor."9
In a recent challenge to Texas' IOLA program, the Fifth Circuit
held that the IOLA program was unconstitutional because it was a
taking of property from the client.'0 However, both the District
Court and the Fifth Circuit "decline[d] to address" the ethical
implications of such a holding." This Comment focuses specifi-
cally on the "ethical implications" and the conflict that the Fifth
Circuit has created with the Professional Codes.'2 Part I explains
9 Id.
'0 WLF, 94 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996). This challenge originated in the
United States District Court, Western District of Texas and can be found at 873
F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995). The District Court decision was affirmed in part,
vacated in part and reversed in part by WLF, 94 F.3d 996. A rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 106 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 1997); the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 117
S. Ct. 2514 (1997). Subsequently, under the caption of Phillips v. Washington
Legal Found., 117 S. Ct. 2535 (1997), certiorari was granted. Arguments were
heard before the Supreme Court on January 13, 1998 but to date no opinion has
been handed down. Dana Coleman, IOLTA Case Could Threaten Funding, N.J.
LAWYER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 1. See discussion infra for a history of the suit.
" WLF, 94 F.3d 996 (the court did not expressly decline to address the
"social, political or public policy concerns[,]" however, it is presumed that they
agreed with the District Court because they did not discuss these issues);
Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 11 (W.D. Tex. 1995) ("The Court
declines to address the expressed social, political or public policy concerns
related to the current operational procedures of the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation as it administers the [IOLA] program.").
"2 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997) (stating
that a lawyer should strive to aid those that cannot afford legal services); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1997) (explaining that lawyers
have a duty to provide legal services for those that cannot afford them and to
participate in activities to improve the law), MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1996) (stating that every person should be able to
obtain legal services); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1
(1996) (stating that lawyers should "assist in making legal services fully
available"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16 (1996)
(stating that lawyers should "support and participate" in activities enabling the
provision of legal services to all people); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1996) (stating that lawyers should support programs
that provide legal services to those that cannot afford them); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1996) (stating that lawyers should
IOLA & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
the concept and history of IOLA; Part II discusses the Fifth
Circuit's decision; Part III presents the conflicting decisions of the
First 3 and Eleventh 14 Circuits; and Part IV highlights the rel-
evant portions of the Professional Codes and discusses the possible
ramifications to both Professional Codes in light of the Fifth
Circuit's decision. This Comment concludes that the Professional
Codes clearly express aspirations for lawyers to aid in providing
legal services to those who cannot afford them either by directly
providing these services or by participating in and supporting the
IOLA programs of their individual states.
I. THE CONCEPT AND HISTORY OF IOLA
A. The Concept of lOLA
In carrying out business transactions, lawyers are given money
by or on behalf of their clients.' 5 Lawyers are required to place
this money into a trust account called a "demand account"' 6 that
is not connected with their own property.17 In addition, a lawyer
must notify a client when money has been received and must
promptly deliver to the client any money that is the property of the
client.18
support programs to improve the legal system); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-9 (1996) (stating that lawyers should assist in making
changes to improve the legal system).
" Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st
Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Massachusetts Bar Found.].
14 Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 484
U.S. 917 (1987).
"s "Some examples include money received from a client's debtor, from a
defendant to satisfy a judgment, from a settlement, or from a client to be used
in a particular transaction." Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.
16 These trust accounts are called "demand accounts" because of the duty of
the lawyer to place clients' funds into "a trust account that permits withdrawal
on demand." See WLF, 94 F.3d at 998.
17 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 15 (1997); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1996).
"8 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15; MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102. For examples of moneys that a
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Before 1980, federal law did not allow banks to pay interest to
these demand accounts.' 9 As a result, demand accounts functioned
as interest-free loans to the bank.2" To prevent banks from being
so unjustly enriched, new federal banking regulations created the
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal ("NOW") account.2 NOW
accounts, which operate as interest-bearing checking accounts,22
"created a vehicle for [lawyers] to pool client funds into an
interest-bearing trust account, provided that none of the funds
belong to a for-profit corporation., 23 But since the costs of
maintaining the trust account were not permitted to be paid from
the interest it generated,24 it did not make good business sense to
place clients' funds into their own trust accounts.25 As a result,
two classes of trust accounts developed.26
client must be notified of or have delivered to him, see supra note 15.
'9 WLF, 94 F.3d at 998.
20 Id.
21 Id. (citing the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (1989))).
22 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1) (1989). "A NOW account has attributes of both
the traditional checking account and the traditional savings account. A draft
drawn on a NOW account is negotiable and may be transferred freely, thus
resembling a checking account. NOW accounts are similar to savings accounts
because they earn interest, unlike demand deposits." Johnson, supra note 7, at
726 n.7.
23 WLF, 94 F.3d at 998; see 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (allowing NOW
accounts to be comprised of commingled funds belonging to various individuals
or non-profit organizations or both).
24 WLF, 94 F.3d at 998 ("[S]uch a practice would constitute an impermis-
sible benefit from the management of the trust account in violation of the ethical
rules."); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 348 (1982) (stating that interest generated on clients' funds in an interest-
bearing account for the sole purpose of "defray[ing] the expense" of administra-
tive costs would violate the MRPC).
25 Separate trust accounts are not justified in these situations because the
funds held will not generate enough interest to cover the administrative costs, and
thereby will not be a benefit to the client. See generally Johnson, supra note 7,
at 726.
26 Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.
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The first class of trust accounts is comprised of individual funds
which can produce interest and therefore, benefit the client." This
occurs when the interest exceeds the cost of maintaining an
independent account and results in income for the client.18 Gener-
ally, these funds are of a substantial amount or are to be held for
a long period of time.29 The second class of trust accounts is
comprised of clients' funds that are nominal in amount or are to be
held for a short period of time.30 Generally these funds do not
produce enough interest to benefit the client or to justify being held
in an independent account. 31 Therefore, instead of being held in
individual accounts, these funds are commingled with other
similarly situated clients' funds and deposited into a single trust
32account. The IOLA program focuses on this second class of trust
accounts.33
Even though these funds are commingled, and are constantly
being deposited and withdrawn, the account is still capable of
earning interest if it is a NOW account.3 4 But to divide and
distribute the interest generated to each client in proportion to the
amount of their individual funds is impractical "because adminis-
trative costs would equal or exceed each clients' portion of the
interest and would often result in a loss to the individual client., 35
Instead, the lawyer will deposit the "unproductive" 36 funds into a
27 Johnson, supra note 7, at 726 (explaining that funds that are "either large
enough... or which are to be held long enough" justify being held in a separate
account because they can generate interest that is in excess of the cost of
maintaining the account, and therefore, will generate income that benefits the
client).
28 Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.
29 ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BOARD, INTEREST ON LAWYER TRUST
ACCOUNTS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, at 1 (July 26, 1982)
[hereinafter ABA REPORT].
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
13 Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.
34 ABA REPORT, supra note 29, at 5; see also supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text (explaining NOW accounts).
31 Johnson, supra note 7, at 726.
36 These funds are labeled "unproductive" because they do not generate
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non-interest bearing demand account.37 Once this is accomplished
the bank once again receives an interest-free loan.38 It is at this
point that IOLA intervenes and shifts the benefit from the banking
institution to the coffers of law-related public interest organiza-
tions.39
The operating principle of IOLA is simple. "Qualified funds"'
are deposited in an IOLA account at the banking institution of the
lawyer's choice.41 IOLA accounts are similar to NOW accounts
in that they are interest-bearing and allow the clients' funds, which
comprise the principal, to be freely deposited and withdrawn.42
The interest that is generated from the deposits is sent directly to
a non-profit organization established to receive the revenue.43
interest and will not benefit the client. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 727.
37 Johnson, supra note 7, at 727.
38 See WLF, 94 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1996); Johnson, supra note 7, at 727
(stating that without the IOLA programs banks retain profits from funds
deposited in non-interest bearing accounts).
39 ABA REPORT, supra note 29, at 1 (explaining how the banking
institution's benefit is shifted to law-related public interest organizations through
the IOLA program).
40 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497(2) (McKinney 1997). This statute defines
"[q]ualified funds" as:
Moneys received by an attorney in a fiduciary capacity from a client
... and which, in the judgment of the attorney, are too small in
amount or are reasonably expected to be held for too short a time to
generate sufficient interest income to justify the expense of adminis-
tering a segregated account for the benefit of the client ....
Id.
41 Id. § 497(4)(a). Section 497(4)(a) states that
an attorney shall have discretion, in accordance with the code of
professional responsibility, to determine whether moneys received by
an attorney in a fiduciary capacity from a client or beneficial owner
shall be deposited in non-interest, or in interest bearing accounts. If in
the judgment of an attorney any moneys received are qualified funds,
such funds shall be deposited in an IOLA account in a banking
institution of his or her choice offering such accounts ....
Id.
42 Johnson, supra note 7, at 727.
43 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v (McKinney 1997) (stating that non-
profit organizations receiving the deposited funds are selected by the IOLA board
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This organization then distributes the funds "as grants and contracts
to not-for-profit tax-exempt entities for the purpose of delivering
civil legal services to the poor and for purposes related to the
improvement of the administration of justice."
The accomplishment of the IOLA program is that it shifts the
benefits derived from the interest generated from the commingled
trust accounts from the bank to the poor for the improvement of the
administration of justice.45 Even with these noble goals:
The IOLA concept should be understood for what it is as
well as for what it is not. It is not a panacea which will
resolve America's problem in providing adequate legal
services to the poor. But, the IOLA concept is a ...
of trustees that is "appointed to administer the New York IOLA fund" and are
guided by the principles set forth within section 97-v of the New York State
Finance Law).
'4 Id. The distribution of the IOLA funds is relatively broad and unstruc-
tured. The board of trustees, comprised of members who are "knowledgeable and
supportive of the delivery of civil legal services to the poor and the improvement
of the administration of justice," are appointed by the governor of New York to
administer the fund. Id. § 97v-(2). The distribution is restricted only by terms set
forth within section 97-v of New York State's Finance Law. The board's
administration power includes the "power to receive, hold and manage any
moneys and property received from any source." Id. § 97-v(3)(a).
While the choice of non-profit organizations to receive IOLA funds is
relatively unrestricted, the proportion of the funds' distribution is specifically
prescribed. Id. § 97-v(3)(b). The Finance Law states that "[n]o less than seventy-
five percent of the total funds distributed in any fiscal year shall be allocated to
not-for-profit tax-exempt providers for the purpose of delivering civil legal
services to the poor." Id. The remaining twenty-five percent of the fund is to be
"allocated for purposes related to the improvement of the administration of
justice, including, but not limited to, the provision of civil legal services to
groups currently under-served by legal services ... and the enhancement of civil
legal services to the poor through innovative and cost-effective means." Id. § 97-
v(3)(c).
Furthermore, the board is empowered to "adopt rules and regulations...
to carry out the purposes and provisions of this section" and to "insure that
grants and contracts are made with not-for-profit providers of civil legal services
for the poor to provide stable, economical and high quality delivery of civil legal
services to the poor throughout the state." Id. § 97-v(3)(d).
" Johnson, supra note 7, at 727-28; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 29,
at 1 (discussing the value of the IOLA program concept).
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unique opportunity to improve the human condition in
exchange for minimal efforts."
With this in mind, it is clear that the IOLA program carries out the
Professional Codes' express intentions of providing law-related
public services and improving the judicial system. 7 In addition,
the program does so in a manner that is easy to administer and
involves very little time or energy on the part of a lawyer, an
especially satisfactory result for all lawyers, whether a sole
practitioner or an employee of a large law firm.48
B. The History of lOLA
Foreign jurisdictions have had IOLA programs since the
1960's. 49 These jurisdictions demonstrated to legal thinkers in the
46 Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 (footnotes omitted).
47 Johnson, supra note 7, at 730.
41 Johnson, supra note 7, at 730. The program is easy to administer because
the attorney's duties are set forth in each individual state's law governing the
IOLA program. For instance, in New York, the Judiciary Law states when an
attorney is to participate in the IOLA program and also states what attorneys
should do with funds that are determined to not be IOLA qualified. N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 497 (McKinney 1997). Once the funds are deposited, the administration
of those funds is placed in the hands of the IOLA program's board of trustees
and wholly out of the hands of the attorney. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v
(McKinney 1997). In addition, an attorney is not liable in damages or able to be
charged with professional misconduct for mistakenly depositing money into an
IOLA account if the attorney exercised judgment in good faith that the funds
were qualified for the program. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497. Once the funds are
deposited in the IOLA program, the purpose of enhancing the administration of
justice and assisting in the provision of civil legal services to the poor is satisfied
and an attorney has acted to fulfill express goals set forth in the Professional
Codes. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble, Rule 6.1
(1997); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1, EC 2-1, EC
2-16, EC 2-25, EC 8-1 (1996).
" ABA REPORT, supra note 29, at 3. For instance, Australia, Canada and
parts of Africa have all adopted some form of an IOLA program. Taylor S.
Boone, Comment, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services,
Part I: An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the
Use of Clients'Funds by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to
Support Programs of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 542-50
(1979).
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United States the value of channeling unproductive client trust
funds into new revenue for various law-related public interest
purposes.50 It was not until 1981, after five years of studying the
possible uses for interest generated from clients' trust accounts, that
the Florida Supreme Court adopted the first IOLA program in the
Australia's early programs were enacted by the individual states with
Victoria being the first state to adopt an IOLA program for the improvement of
the administration of justice. Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.24. Following
Victoria's lead, other states adopted their own IOLA programs, all of which
require mandatory participation. Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.24. The basic
plan of the Australian states was to require
the transfer to the applicable law society or law foundation an average
of between one-third and two-thirds, of the lowest balance of the
principal held in the lawyer's trust accounts during the preceding
statutory period. The funds are then invested by the law society or law
foundation and the interest used for the Solicitor's Guarantee Fund or
for legal aid.
Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.24.
While British Columbia was the first Canadian province to adopt an IOLA
program, by the 1970's all 10 of the provinces and the Yukon and Northwest
Territories had adopted their own mandatory programs. Johnson, supra note 7,
at 730 n.25. In contrast to the Australian plan, which requires only a proportion
of the funds from lawyer's trust accounts be given to the administering
organization, the Canadian plan requires the entire fund be turned over to the
administrator unless there is a "written agreement between the solicitor and his
client concerning the disposition of interest or unless the client directs the funds
to be held in a separate account." Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.25. The
administrator then places the funds in an interest bearing trust account, the
interest from which is "remitted to the law foundation" to be used for "legal
education, research, legal aid, law libraries, [or] law reform." Johnson, supra note
7, at 730 n.25.
The IOLA programs of the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa
and Zimbabwe are "less comparable with those of Australia and Canada."
Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.26. The major difference is that the African plans
are not mandatory. Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.26. Generally, in the African
plans, if the "attorney determines that he will not invest funds for the client's
benefit, he is not required to place the funds in a trust savings account. Interest
accruing on trust savings accounts must be remitted to the equivalent of a client's
security fund." Johnson, supra note 7, at 730 n.26.
50 See Arthur J. England, Jr. & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on
Trust Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J. 101, 102 (1982) (highlighting the benefits
to the foreign jurisdictions with IOLA-like programs).
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United States. 5' Under the Florida IOLA program, participation
was voluntary 2 and the interest from the account was funneled
directly to the state's bar foundation to fund legal services "for
indigents, to provide law student loans, to improve the administra-
tion of justice, and to finance other public programs. '53  In
response to Florida's successful ratification of IOLA, and also
partly due to the extreme need to improve the country's legal
system for the poor, other states began to develop and adopt their
own programs.54 Presently, almost every state has adopted some
sort of IOLA program." Only Indiana has consistently refused to
S See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1981)
(adopting the Florida IOLA fund).
52 Florida's IOLA program was implemented as a voluntary program by the
Florida Supreme Court. Id. The Florida Supreme Court has subseqently amended
the IOLA program to mandatory. In re Interest on Trust Accounts: A Petition to
Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 538 So. 2d 448, 453 (Fla. 1989).
" Johnson, supra note 7, at 731.
14 Sackmary, supra note 5, at 190. For example:
In 1981, the California legislature enacted a mandatory program which
earmarked all proceeds for legal aid. Idaho's Supreme Court authorized
a voluntary program in 1982 which remits interest to the Idaho Law
Foundation to support delivery of legal services and other programs.
Also, in 1982, Maryland's legislature authorized voluntary participation
in an [IOLA] program and directed interest to a state legal service
corporation providing legal services to indigents.
Johnson, supra note 7, at 731.
" 49 states and the District of Columbia acknowledge IOLA as constitu-
tional and ethical. Sackmary, supra note 5, at 190. These states have authorized
IOLA programs through either legislation or court rule. ALA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1992); ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.15(d) (1989); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-
102 (1989); RULES OF THE ARIZ. SUP. CT. Rule 29(a) (1984); ARK. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1994); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
art. 14, ch. 4, §§ 6210-6228 (1981); COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.15 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-81(c) (1993); CONN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1993); DEL. LAWYERS' CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1983); D.C. COURT OF APPEALS
RULES GOVERNING THE BAR Rule 10, App. B (1985); RULES REGULATING THE
FLA. BAR Rule 5-1.1(d) (1989); RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZA-
TION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE BAR OF GA. Rule 4-102(d), standard 65
(1989); GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102, Rule 3-109
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accept an IOLA program stating that such programs are unconsti-
(1989); HAW. SuP. CT. R. 11 (1991); IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.15 (1989); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1.15 (1987); IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-103 (1985); KAN. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1992); KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.830 (1991); LA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1995); ME. BAR RULES 3.6(e)(4), (5)
(1993); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-303 (1995); MASS. SUP. JUD.
CT. R. 3:07 (1990); MASS. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102
(1990); MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1990); MINN.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(d) (1993); Miss. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1993); Mo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.15(d) (1996); MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.15, 1.18 (1996); NEB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 217-221 (1992); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 50, 50-A (1991);
N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1:28A (1988); N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
16-115 (1988); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. STATE FIN. § 97-v
(McKinney 1984); NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
10.3 (1988); N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4705.09-.10 (1985); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
9-101(D) (1989); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1996); R.I.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1988); S.C. CT. APP. R. 412
(1987); S.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1987); TENN. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1988); STATE BAR OF TEX.
RULES art. XI (1982); UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15
(1983); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-103 (1990); VA.
SUP. CT. Canon 9 (1995); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14
(1984); W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1989); WISC.
SUP. CT. R. 20:1.15 (1989); WYO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule 1.15 (1990). Six of these states have also issued court
opinions authorizing the IOLA programs. In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 675 S.W.2d 355, 356-57 (Ark. 1984); In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1981); In re Petition by Massachusetts Bar
Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 716 (Mass. 1985); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332
N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982); In re Petition of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453
A.2d 1258, 1260 (N.H. 1982); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672
P.2d 406, 406 (Utah 1983). Indiana's state bar association has authorized an
IOLA program through legislation but it has never been implemented due to
denial of its constitutionality and ethicality by court opinion. In re Indiana State
Bar Ass'n's Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest on Lawyers'
Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 312 (Ind. 1990).
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tutional and unethical.5 6
While Florida remains the model for IOLA programs, states
have differed on whether to make them mandatory, voluntary or
"opt-out.""7 In the mandatory programs, the state requires interest
to be earned on all lawyers' trust accounts whether for the client or
for contribution to IOLA programs.5 8 Voluntary programs require
participating lawyers who open IOLA accounts to inform their local
bar association as to the establishment of such a fund.59 Non-
participating lawyers in a voluntary IOLA program state may
deposit a client's nominal or short-term funds into non-interest
bearing accounts.6" An "opt-out" state requires lawyers to initially
enroll in the program, but allows them to withdraw from participa-
tion during an annual opt-out period if they find that they do not
wish to continue their participation in the program.6
56 See In re Public Law No. 154-1990, 561 N.E.2d 791, 793-94 (Ind. 1990)
(rendering the entire IOLA program unconstitutional); In re Indiana State Bar
Ass'n's Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 312 (Ind. 1990) (refusing to implement an IOLA
program because the interest proceeds belong to the clients, and therefore the
program diverts clients' funds, and convolutes attorneys' fiduciary duty to their
clients).
17 See Rachel Scovill Worthington, Comment, IOTA - Overcoming its
Current Obstacles, 18 STETSON L. REv. 415, 419 (1989) (describing types of
IOLA programs).
5 Id. at 418. There are 25 mandatory IOLA states: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. Id.
'9 Id. at 420-21. There are 9 voluntary IOLA states: Alaska, Arkansas,
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana (whose state court has an authorized IOLA program
but has not implemented it at this time), New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota
and Wyoming. Id.
60 Id. at 419.
61 Id. at 420-21. Attorneys choose to "opt-out" mainly due to lack of
knowledge of the purpose and mechanics of the program. Id. at 421 n.38.
Basically, an "opt-out" program "encouragesbroaderparticipation while retaining
the element of individual choice." Id. at 421. "Opt-out" plans require attorneys
to affirmatively exclude themselves from the IOLA program when they prefer
not to participate. Id. There are 16 opt-out IOLA states: Alabama, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
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Whether voluntary, mandatory or opt-out, the states "recog-
nize[] the potential for public good in the program." 62 In addition,
the program allows lawyers to satisfy their professional responsibil-
ity of making legal services available to individuals who are unable
to afford them and to improve the administration of justice.63
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION V.
TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOUNDATION
In order to fully understand the state of affairs regarding Texas'
IOLA program it is important to examine how both the District
Court and the Fifth Circuit arrived at their respective decisions. In
doing so, it is evident that the Fifth Circuit is not only in conflict
with the First and Eleventh Circuits, but confused within its own
court system as well.'
In the United States District Court, Western District of Texas,
the plaintiffs65 brought a suit claiming, inter alia, that the Texas
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts program operated in violation
of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.66 The Texas IOLA
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia. The
District of Columbia also has an opt-out program. Id.
62 Id. at 420.
63 Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997)
(stating that lawyers should strive to provide legal assistance to those that can not
afford it); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (same) (1997);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC I -1 (1996) (stating that all
people should have access to legal services); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1996) (stating that lawyers should participate in
improving the availability of legal service).
64 Compare WLF, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding IOLA unconstitu-
tional), with Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding
IOLA constitutional), Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir.
1987) (same), and Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(same).
65 The plaintiffs included are "the Washington Legal Foundation, a self-
described non-profit public interest law and policy center, Michael Mazzone, a
Texas resident and attorney licensed to practice by the Texas Bar, and William
Summers, a Texas resident and consumer of legal services rendered by members
of the Texas Bar." Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 3.
66 Id.
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program, 67 established by the Rules of the State Bar of Texas,68
requires lawyers that receive clients' funds that are "nominal in
amount" or "reasonably anticipated to be held for a short period of
time" to be deposited in a commingled interest-bearing trust
account. 69 These funds, which are not reasonably expected to earn
interest for the benefit of the client, are the only funds which
qualify for IOLA in Texas.70 If the lawyer reasonably believes
that the funds could generate interest for the client, then the lawyer
is not prohibited from depositing them into an individual non-IOLA
account. 71 The interest generated by the IOLA funds are chan-
neled to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, a defendant
in this action, 72 which then distributes the funds to the state's non-
profit law-related organizations.73 The program began as a
voluntary venture, but because it generated insufficient funds, it
was subsequently amended to be mandatory.74
Plaintiffs claimed that the mandatory program violated their
Fifth Amendment rights by taking their property without just
compensation.75 Plaintiffs specifically argued that the interest
67 There are no significant differences between Texas and New York's IOLA
program. Refer to Part L.A for a description of the New York IOLA program.
68 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS art. Xl, § 2 (1985) (implementing the IOLA program in Texas);
Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 4.
69 Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 4.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 The defendants, in addition to the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation, a non-profit law-related public interest organization, are W. Frank
Newton, the Foundation's chairperson and all nine Justices of the Texas Supreme
Court. Id. at 3.
7' These organizations "provide a wide range of legal services, ranging from
providing legal assistance to permanent resident aliens seeking naturalization, to
documentation for Central American refugees seeking asylum, to legal services
to death row inmates, to various AIDS organizations." Id. at 4.
74 Id. at 5 n.5 (stating that the need for improvement of legal services has
been a prominent issue facing Texas and therefore providing funds is of the
utmost importance (citing State Bar of Texas v. Maria Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243,
247 (Tex. 1994))).
71 Id. at 5. The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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generated from the trust accounts was client property and was
wrongly seized by the state.76
In opposition to these claims, the defendants argued that neither
of these violations existed.77 Specifically, defendants argued that
the Fifth Amendment claim was without merit because the IOLA
program actually created funds that clients would never see and
would not have been generated without IOLA.78 Without the
IOLA program, clients' funds would still be commingled in non-
interest bearing accounts.79 If funds were commingled, it is
obvious that clients would never earn interest, therefore, clients do
not have any property interest to contest under IOLA.s° The
defendants further argued that the IOLA program, while creating
interest, never allows that interest to go to the client, and therefore,
the client continues to have no property interest. 81 Finding the
defendants' arguments persuasive, the District Court held that the
IOLA program did not violate plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
rights.82
The plaintiffs also claimed that the IOLA program violated their
First Amendment rights by depriving them of their "freedom of
speech and association."83 Specifically, the plaintiffs stated that
76 Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 5.
"The Defendants have responded that the [IOLA] Program neither effects
a taking of the interest generated by the Program in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, nor compels speech or involuntary association in violation of the
First Amendment." Id. at 3.
" Id. at 5 ("[P]roperty interests ... are not created by the Constitution.
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . ..."
(quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980))).
'9 See id. at 6.
80 See id.
SI Id. at 8.
82Id. ("[T]he Court finds no constitutional infirmity with respect to
attorneys' . . . participation in the [IOLA] program.").
" Id. at 9. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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the mandatory involvement in the IOLA program forced them to
associate with "various recipient organizations whose purported
objectives the plaintiffs find objectionable.,1 4 The court recog-
nized that freedom of speech is a "well-established" and "protec-
ted" right which includes the right to "refrain from speech" and to
be free from forced support of groups with "political and ideologi-
cal purposes with which [an individual] disagrees." 5 While
acknowledging the importance and sanctity of these First Amend-
ment rights, the court stated that plaintiffs' claim was dependent on
the outcome of their Fifth Amendment claim. 6 If the interest
generated was not determined to be the property of the plaintiffs,
and therefore, not a taking without compensation, then "the
collection and use of the interest by the [IOLA] program does not
constitute financial support by the plaintiffs of the recipient
organizations."87 The court then held that because they found no
property right there could be no forced association, and therefore,
no violation of the First Amendment.88 Thus, the Texas IOLA
program was held constitutional.89
It is important to point out that while not explicitly admitting
it had considered the ABA's MRPC or Texas' version of the CPR,
the court concluded that it did not want to address the "social,
Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 9.
85 Id. The court stated that:
It is well-established that the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment includes the freedom to choose "both what to say and
what not to say." The right to refrain from speech is violated when the
government compels an individual to endorse a belief that he or she
finds repugnant. It also may be violated when the government compels
an individual to subsidize political and ideological purposes with which
he or she disagrees.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. ("[T]he Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege any connection
between themselves and the [IOLA] recipient organizations, the Court finds that
the Texas [IOLA] Program does not unconstitutionally burden the Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights." (citing Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 980 (1st
Cir. 1983))).
89 Id. at 11.
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political or public policy concerns" related to the IOLA pro-
gram.90 But even while the court claimed not to be addressing
these issues, it clearly stated that the "undisputed purpose of the
[IOLA] Program [was] to provide funding for legal services"'
and that the program "squarely fit" within the goals of "improving
the quality of the legal service available to the people of the
state. 92 These statements, made by a court purporting to avoid
discussing the implications of the goals of the Professional Codes,
do in fact show that the IOLA program embodies the expressed
desire of the Professional Codes to assist in providing legal services
to the poor and improve the judicial system.93
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit disagreed with the District Court's decision and instead
determined that there was a violation of the Fifth Amendment
because the interest earned was clients' "property., 94 The Fifth
Circuit based its reversal on the fact that Texas had always
followed the "traditional rule" that interest, as a product of the
principal, is thereby, part of the principal.95 Based on this rule, it
would appear that the interest generated by funds in the IOLA
account is the property of the clients who had their principal
deposited therein.96 The Fifth Circuit simply concluded that the
90 Id. ("The Court declines to address the expressed social, political or public
policy concerns related to the current operational procedures of the Texas Equal
Access to Justice Foundation as it administers the [IOLA] program. Alleviation
of these concerns rests with Texas attorneys... the state bar... [and] elected
public officials.").
91 Id. at 10.
92 Id. "The undisputed purpose of the [IOLA] Program is to provide funding
for legal services to a substantial segment of the population of Texas. This
squarely fits within the purview of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people of the state." Id. at 9.
9' See id. (explaining that while the court did not desire to address the
ethical considerations of the IOLA program, its unquestionable goal was to aid
in procuring legal services to those that could not afford it).
9' See WLF, 94 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996).
" Id. at 1000. "Texas observes the traditional rule that 'interest follows
principal,' which recognizes that interest earned on a deposit of principal belongs
to the owner of the principal." Id.
96 Id.
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District Court adopted theories advocated by the First and Eleventh
Circuits9 7 which "circumvent[ed] this rule. '9 8
The Fifth Circuit also determined that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Webbk Fabulous Pharmacies v
Beckwith99 added credence to the Texas rule, and its reversal of
the District Court, that interest follows principal.'/° In Webb
Fabulous Pharmacies, Beckwith"°' was appointed receiver of
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies" 2 when its sale to Eckerd's was
inhibited by a previously existing, but not previously revealed,
debt.' O3 Eckerd's had filed a "complaint of interpleader" against
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies and its creditors in order to resolve
the existing debt. " As a result, Eckerd's was required by the
9' See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 973 (1st Cir. 1993)
(explaining that interest earned on clients' funds held in IOLA accounts were
never the clients' because IOLA created it and since it took only what it created,
no property interest was violated); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002,
1005 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that there was no property interest in the fund's
generated interest because the IOLA program only took what it created). These
Circuit Court decisions are discussed in Part IV of this Comment.
98 WLF, 94 F.3d at 1000. "The district court concluded that the plaintiffs
cannot 'have a [cognizable] property interest in interest proceeds that, but for the
[IOLA] Program, would have never been generated. "'Id. (quoting Massachusetts
Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 980).
99 449 U.S. 155 (1980), rev'g Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam) [hereinafter Webb's].
100 See WLF, 94 F.3d at 1000-01.
'10 Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158. Beckwith was appointed receiver of the
business known as Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies in order to determine the
number and amount of creditors' claims filed against the business. Id. The
purchaser of the business, Eckerd's, filed the purchase price with the clerk of the
court pending determination of the creditors' claims. Id. Beckwith requested the
funds be turned over to him in order to deal with the creditors. Id. The court
transferred the funds but kept the interest that had accrued through the required
escrow account that the funds were deposited in. Id. Beckwith thereby became
the plaintiff of this suit seeking to recover the interest. Id.
102 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies was the defendant in the proceeding. Id. at
157.
103 Id. at 156-57.
104 Id.
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court to tender the purchase price to the clerk of the court.'0 5 As
required by state law, the funds were placed in an interest-bearing
account and remained there until the matter was resolved.'16 On
resolution of the matter, Beckwith, the court appointed receiver in
charge of paying the creditors, demanded the funds be turned over
to him.10 7 The Florida state court complied and returned the
principal but did not return the interest that had been generated
while on deposit in the court's interest-bearing account.'
Beckwith then filed suit to recover the interest.'09 The Florida
Supreme Court determined that the interest was not the property of
the creditors' because it was only generated due to the statute that
required funds deposited with the court to be held in an interest-
bearing account."0 Therefore, they were not entitled to the
interest. 11
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that under
Florida law, the principal was the private property of the creditor
because it was not held for the benefit of the court, but instead for
'o' Id. at 157-58. The purchase price of $1.8 million was required by Florida
law to be delivered to the clerk of the court for deposit into an interest-bearing
account, to retain the interest earned for the court and to deduct statutorily-
defined fees for maintaining the funds. Id. at 157. The action of interpleader,
filed by purchaser Eckerd's, was commenced in order to resolve the debt owed
to Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies' creditors and ultimately to own the pharmacies
as he originally intended. Id. Therefore, the funds were required to be deposited
with the clerk of the court to ensure that the debt was paid before such transfer
took effect. See id. at 157-58.
106 Id. at 157.
'07 Id. at 158.
10' The funds held in the interest-bearing account for the year which it took
to resolve the matter accrued interest of more than $100,000. Id. On demand to
return the funds, the clerk complied but withheld approximately $10,000 for
administrative fees and the $100,000 in interest that had accrued. Id.
109 Id.
1.0 Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 952-53
(Fla. 1979) (per curiam).
" "Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court ruled against [Beckwith], holding
that there was no unconstitutional taking because money deposited with the clerk
was public money, interest earned on public money was not private property, and
the statute only took that which it created." Beckwith, 374 So. 2d at 952-53.
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the benefit of the creditors." 2 Once it was determined that the
creditors owned the principal, the Supreme Court then determined
ownership of the interest that had been generated."' The Court
concluded that the State could not "assert ownership of...
interest" from funds placed in an interest-bearing account simply
due to the fact that it was statutorily required." 4 The Supreme
Court explained that traditional Florida law made clear that interest
from deposited funds was part of the principal and therefore owned
by whoever owned the principal." 5 Finally, the Supreme Court
declared that Florida's keeping of the interest constituted an
unconstitutional taking. 1
6
The Fifth Circuit in WLF relied on Webb' in support of its
conclusion that interest from clients' funds placed in an interest-
bearing account should also be considered property of the client, as
owner of the principal."7 The Fifth Circuit, like the Supreme
Court in Webb ', found the retention of this interest an unconstitu-
12 Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161. See also WLF, 94 F.3d 996, 1001 (5th Cir.
1996) ("[B]ecause the principal was 'held only for the ultimate benefit of Webb's
creditors, not for the benefit of the court' and eventually would be distributed to
them, state law gave the creditors a property interest proportional to the share of
the principal." (quoting Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161)).
113 Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162.
114 Id. See also WLF, 94 F.3d at 1001 ("Reaching the opposite conclusion
from that of the Florida Supreme Court, the Webb's Court held that simply
because the state ordered the placement of interpleaded funds into an interest-
bearing account does not mean that the state can assert ownership of that
interest.").
15 Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162-63. In recognizing Florida's traditional rule and
its effect, the Court stated:
[T]he usual and general rule under Florida law is that any interest on
an interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be
allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal,
[therefore,] ... earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the
fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property.
Id.
116 Id. at 163. See also WLF, 94 F.3d at 1001 ("The Court then concluded
that the Florida law perpetrated an unconstitutional taking of interest, which is
the property of the creditors who own the principal.").
17 WLF, 94 F.3d at 1002.
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tional taking." 8 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the District
Court was wrong in concluding that clients do not have a property
interest in the interest earned from their funds in the IOLA
accounts."19
Subsequently, the defendants petitioned for rehearing; this
petition was denied. 20 In a scathing dissent, several judges called
the majority's decision "an important one" because it took the
opposite position of almost every other court in the country that has
addressed the issue, including two other circuit courts and a "large
number" of state appellate courts. 2' As important as the dissent-
ing opinion was in explaining why the case should be reheard, the
118 Id. The Fifth Circuit declared:
The Webb's decision, however, creates a rule ... that a property
interest existed in the accrued interest simply because "[tihe earnings
of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property
just as the fund itself is property." We see no reason why this rule
does not apply to the instant case.
Id. (quoting Webb's, 499 U.S. at 164).
9 Id. at 1005. The Fifth Circuit subsequently vacated the District Court's
decision and remanded the matter for further consideration. Id. ("For the
foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred by holding that the clients
do not have a cognizable property interest in the interest proceeds that are earned
on their deposit in [IOLA] accounts.").
120 Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 106
F.3d 640, 641 (5th Cir. 1997). The Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc was denied and a dissenting opinion was written and joined
by four of the circuit court judges including the Chief Judge. Id. at 641
(Benavides, J., dissenting).
.2 Id. ("This decision is an important one because it contradicts every other
court in the country that has addressed this issue, including two of our sister
circuits and a large number of state appellate courts."). Compare WLF, 94 F.3d
at 1005 (holding that interest generated from clients' funds on deposit in IOLA
accounts is property of the client and therefore Texas' IOLA program is
unconstitutional), with Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 968 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that no property right was violated and therefore Massachusetts'
IOLA program was constitutional), Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002,
1004 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that no property right was violated and therefore
Florida's IOLA program was constitutional), and Washington Legal Found., 873
F. Supp. 1, 8 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that funds generated from IOLA
accounts were not the property of the client and therefore Texas' IOLA program
was constitutional).
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dissenting judges impliedly addressed the important professional
and ethical responsibility issue at stake. 2 ' The judges stated that
this decision would be an "unwarranted" denial of funds to "public
interest legal organizations" at a time when they were desperately
needed.'23 While the dissenting judges recognized the importance
of this issue, it was not directly addressed because of the refusal of
the District Court to address the issue.'24
After denial of their petition for rehearing, "'25 the defendants
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.'26 This too was denied. 127 Subsequently, the petition was
amended and granted regarding only the Fifth Amendment taking
of property issue. 128 While the Supreme Court has heard argu-
ments on this issue, the final disposition of this case is pend-
ing. 129
The threat to IOLA programs in the United States is clear: a
determination for plaintiffs will not only invalidate Texas' program,
but it will likely open the door for similar suits in states with
similar programs in operation. In addition, it will also strike a
122 Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 106 F.3d at 641 (Benavides, J.,
dissenting).
123 Id. at 641-42 ("[T]his case poses an unwarranted threat to a primary
source of funding for public interest legal organizations in this circuit at a time
when these organizations are already struggling for their lives financially.").
124 See Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 6 n.9, 11 (implying that
the court declined to address the ethical implications behind the IOLA program).
125 Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 106 F.3d at 641.
126 Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 117
S. Ct. 2514 (1997).
127 Id. at 2514.
128 See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 117 S. Ct. 2535 (1997). The
Supreme Court of the United States stated that
[t]he petition for writ of certiorari is granted limited to the following
question: Is interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in
[IOLA] accounts a property interest of the client or lawyer, cognizable
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, despite
the fundamental precept of [IOLA] that such funds, absent the [IOLA]
program, could earn interest for the client of lawyer?
Id. at 2535.
129 See Coleman, supra note 10, at I (stating that arguments before the
Supreme Court would be on January 13, 1998).
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severe blow to the Professional Codes whose express language
demands the enactment of progressive programs like IOLA to aid
in meeting its goals of providing services to the poor.131 While
the result is clear and harsh, the Fifth Circuit ignored the ethical
implications altogether.
III. THE CONFLICTING CIRCUITS
Prior to the 1995 challenge to the Texas IOLA program,'3'
there had only been two serious challenges to IOLA programs in
the United States. 32 Both challenges involved clients who
"alleged that their property was 'taken' when interest earned on
client funds in a lawyer's trust account accrued to a [designated
law-related public interest organization].' 33 In Cone v State Bar
of Florida, ' 31 the Eleventh Circuit found that clients had no claim
of entitlement to interest generated by their commingled fuands, and
therefore, upheld the Florida IOLA program. 35 In Washington
Legal Foundation v Massachusetts Bar Foundation,36 the First
30 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997) (stating
that a lawyer should be "mindful of deficiencies" in the law and should assist the
bar in an attempt to change the law); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 1-1 (1996) (explaining that in order to provide legal services to
society, lawyers should strive to improve the law to meet everyone's needs);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1996) (stating an
"important function[] of the legal profession" is to strive to make legal services
obtainable by all); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25
(1996) (stating that "[e]very lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet
[the] need for legal services").
131 The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas heard
the arguments of the parties on January 19, 1995. Washington Legal Found., 873
F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
132 Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note, Florida's IOLTA Program Does Not "Take"
Client Property for Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 57 U. CIN. L. REv.
369, 369 (1988) (stating that the two serious challenges were Massachusetts Bar
Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993) and Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d
1002 (11 th Cir. 1987)).
133 Id.
134 819 F.2d 1002 (1lth Cir. 1987).
135 Id. at 1007.
136 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Circuit found that clients did not suffer from Fifth Amendment
violations when interest accrued from their commingled funds was
placed into the Massachusetts IOLA program.'37 The court also
found that participation in the IOLA program was not a violation
of a client's First Amendment right to freedom of speech and
association. 38 Both the First and Eleventh Circuit courts ulti-
mately found their respective states' IOLA programs constitutional,
and by upholding the programs they implicitly affirmed the
Professional Codes' express purpose of providing law-related public
services to those that cannot afford them on their own. 39
A. Cone v State Bar of Florida
In Cone v State Bar of Florida, the plaintiff"40 invoked the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 4' in an attempt to strike
down Florida's IOLA program. 42 In retaining a law firm to
probate the estate of her deceased husband, plaintiff paid a retainer
of $100 which was deposited into a noninterest-bearing trust
account. 143 At the conclusion of its involvement, the law firm
unintentionally retained plaintiff's balance.'44 Soon after,
Florida's IOLA program was approved by the State's Supreme
137 Id. at 974.
131 Id. at 980.
139 See generally Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962; Cone, 819 F.2d
1002.
140 Jean Ann Cone, the named plaintiff, was the personal representative of
the Estate of Evelyn M. Glaeser, the original plaintiff who passed away during
the litigation of this suit. Id. at 1004 n. 1.
141 The takings clause is found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which states in part, "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142 Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004 (stating that plaintiff claimed that she was
deprived her property without'due process). Florida's IOLA program transfers
the interest generated from certain types of clients' funds that are placed in a
lawyer's interest-bearing trust account to legal aid programs and other public
organizations. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1003.
143 Id.
'4 Plaintiff had a balance of $13.75. Id. at 1004.
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Court14 5 and the law firm decided to transfer its nominal or short-
term trust account funds, which included plaintiff s balance, into an
IOLA account. 46 Plaintiff's balance remained in the IOLA
account for close to three years. 147 When the error was discovered
the firm issued a check to plaintiff in the amount of the bal-
ance. 48 Under the IOLA program, the interest that was generated
over the three year period 49 was transferred to the Florida Bar
Foundation.'"0 Plaintiff then filed suit 1' to recover the interest
claiming, inter alia,152 that Florida's IOLA program had resulted
in an "uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment."''
41 Id. The Florida IOLA program is described as follows:
The [IOLA] plan authorized, but did not require, lawyers and law
firms to place nominal or short-term funds into pooled interest-bearing
accounts, the interest proceeds of which to be remitted by the financial
institution directly to the Florida Bar Foundation. The Foundation
would then allot the funds to legal aid organizations, law student
scholarships, and other charitable purposes. Only deposits which could
otherwise not earn interest net of expenses (because they were nominal
in amount or were to be held for a short period of time) could be used
to generate interest under the [IOLA] program.
Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 The amount of interest generated was $2.25. Id.
150 Id.
..' In 1995, plaintiff filed a class action suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 626 F.
Supp. 132 (M.D. Fla. 1985), claiming to represent "all persons similarly situated
against the law firm, the Florida Bar, and the Florida Bar Foundation." Id. at
1003.
'52 In addition to the Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiff also claimed "that the
appropriation of the interest earned on her money" was a "deprivation of her
property without due process, as well as a breach of fiduciary duty under state
law." Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. But after the court ruled that there was no
violation of the Fifth Amendment, it declined to hear arguments based on these
additional claims. Id.
153 Id. The Fifth Amendment claim was "applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Plaintiff's "argument was simple: any interest
earned on her portion of the [law firm's IOLA] account belonged to her." Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's determination that the Florida IOLA program was constitu-
tional and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the interest generated
from her balance.1"4 The court stated that the plaintiff's constitu-
tional claim was based on "whether the interest earned on nominal
or short term funds held in an [IOLA] account was the property of
the client for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."' Under the traditional Florida property rule that
"interest follows principle," it appeared that the plaintiff did have
a valid constitutional claim.'56 But because the court found that
the plaintiffs funds would not have generated any interest if not
for the IOLA program there would have been no interest to follow
her principal.'57 Therefore, she was not entitled to the inter-
est. 58 In addition, the court found that the "regulations governing
interest-bearing accounts"'59 and the nominal amount of the
deposit could not have generated interest in excess of the cost of
administering the IOLA account. 16' According to the court, this
was further evidence that the plaintiff had no "legitimate claim of
entitlement to the interest which she claimed was taken from her.
".6' Thus, Florida's IOLA program was upheld. 162
154 See id. at 1002.
' Id. at 1004.
156 Id.
117 Id. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned "that 'interest goes with the principle,
as the fruit with the tree'. . . necessarily assumed the existence of a fruit-bearing
tree. The District Court found that in the absence of the [IOLA] program, [the
plaintiff's] money would not have borne any fruit, for her benefit or for anyone
else's." Id. at 1004 (quoting Himley v. Rose, 9 U.S. 313, 319 (1809)).
158 Id.
159 "[O]nly funds owned by individuals, certain charitable non-profit
organizations, or public entities are allowed to receive interest on their ...
accounts." Id. at 1005 (citing the Consumer Checking Account Equity Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1982) (discussing eligible depositors for NOW accounts)).
160 Id. at 1004 ("[The] economic realities of attempting to produce income
with such nominal or short-term deposits ... could not have earned any interest
net of expenses without the [IOLA].")
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1008. Plaintiff subsequently filed for a writ of certiorari which was
denied. Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 484 U.S. 917 (1987).
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B. Washington Legal Foundation v Massachusetts Bar
Foundation
In Washington Legal Foundation v Massachusetts Bar
Foundation,163 the plaintiffs164 attempted to strike down Massa-
chusetts' IOLA program 165 claiming that the program operated in
violation of their constitutional rights. 166 Plaintiffs' initial argu-
ment focused on the theory that their First Amendment rights were
violated because the IOLA program collected the interest generated
by their funds and distributed it to designated public interest
organizations which were then used for "litigation involving
163 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
4 The five plaintiffs in this suit were: 1) the Washington Legal Foundation,
"a non-profit, public interest law and policy center operating in Washington,
D.C."; 2) Karen Parker, a Massachusetts citizen "who ... employed lawyers in
connection with her real estate... and other businesses, which.., resulted in
her money being deposited in [IOLA] accounts"; 3) Stephanie Davis, a
Massachusetts citizen who did not have any funds in an IOLA account but
anticipated that she might "need to hire an attorney which would cause her
money to be deposited in an [IOLA] account"; 4) William R. Tuttle, a
Massachusetts citizen and attorney who did not maintain an IOLA account; and
5) Timothy J. Howes, a Massachusetts citizen and attorney who did maintain an
IOLA account. Id. at 969.
165 Massachusetts' IOLA program was established as a voluntary program in
1985 pursuant to an amendment to Canon 9, DR 9-102 of Rule 3:07 of the Rules
of the Supreme Judicial Court. See In re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n., 478 N.E.2d
715, 715-16 (Mass. 1985) (explaining the debate surrounding affirming the IOLA
program). In 1990, it was changed to a mandatory program. Massachusetts Bar
Found., 993 F.2d at 969.
The program allows the IOLA Committee to transfer the interest generated
from interest-bearing accounts comprised of pooled clients' funds that "were
nominal in amount or to be held for only a short period of time" from a banking
institution to eligible charities, such as "Massachusetts Legal Assistance, the
Massachusetts Bar Foundation, and the Boston Bar Foundation." Id. at 968.
Under Massachusetts rules, 67% of the funds are to be given to Massachusetts
Legal Assistance and the remaining 33% to other charitable entities. Id. at 969.
166 Id. ("The plaintiffs allege.., that they have been deprived.., of their
rights secured by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
by operation of the Massachusetts [IOLA] program.").
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political or ideological causes and lobbying.' ' 167 This, they stated,
"compel[led] them to support political and ideological causes" with
which they did not agree, thereby resulting in a "depriv[ation] of
freedom of speech and association.' 6 8 In addition, the plaintiffs
also claimed that the disbursement of interest took "the beneficial
use of [their] funds which constitute[d] an unconstitutional taking
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 69
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the District Court's determination 70 that the Massachu-
setts IOLA program did not violate the First or Fifth Amend-
ments. 17' The court first dealt with the plaintiffs' claim that the
Massachusetts IOLA program operated in violation of their Fifth
Amendment rights. 172 In applying a Fifth Amendment analy-
sis, 173 the court found that clients, including plaintiffs, did not
have a constitutionally protected property right to exclude others
from the beneficial use of their funds while those funds are
deposited in IOLA accounts. 174 The court explained that the
IOLA program complied with the State's disciplinary rules
regarding client funds by leaving the deposited funds untouched,
167 Id. at 973. The First Amendment directly provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This has been interpreted to "protect[] the
right not to speak or associate, as well as the right to speak and associate freely."
See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 976.
168 id.
169 Id. The Fifth Amendment states in part that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
370 See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 795 F. Supp.
50 (D. Mass. 1992).
171 See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 968.
172 Id. at 973.
173 The test applied by the court was whether "the [IOLA] program ha[d]
caused a physical invasion and occupation, [even of a temporary nature,] of their
tangible property rights." Id. at 976.
171 Id. For further discussion of courts' methods of finding that clients do not
have constitutionally protected property rights in interest placed in IOLA
accounts, see Philip F. Downey, Attorneys' Trust Accounts: The Bar's Role in
the Preservation of Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275 (1988).
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always available to the clients and that the interest earned was
never the client's property.'75 In conclusion, the court simply
stated that there was no constitutionally protected Fifth Amendment
right because the IOLA program did not occupy or invade their
property.1
76
In considering whether the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
were violated, the court applied a strict scrutiny test consisting of
two parts. 177 The first part of the test examined whether the
IOLA program was a burden to protected speech by "forcing
expression through compelled support of organizations espousing
ideologies or engaging in political activities. ,178 The second part
of the test inquired as to whether the IOLA program "serves
compelling state interests through means which are narrowly
tailored and germane to the state interests.' ' 79 The court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a compelling
connection between them and the recipient public interest organi-
zations, and thereby failed to meet the first part of the test. 80
Because the first part was not met, the court deemed it unnecessary
to inquire further. 8' As a result, the court found that the plain-
tiffs' First Amendment rights were not violated' 82 and Massachu-
setts' IOLA program was upheld. 83
171 Massachusetts Bar Found, 993 F.2d at 976.
176 Id. ("The property rights claimed by the plaintiffs are intangible. We find
no logical or legal support for the plaintiffs' claim that the [IOLA] program has
caused a physical invasion and occupation of their intangible property rights.").
177 Id. at 977.
178 Id.
179 Id.
"' Id. at 980 ("Because the plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the
[IOLA] Rule compels a connection between them and the [IOLA] recipient
organizations, we find that the [IOLA] Rule does not burden the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights.").
181 Id ("Having found no impact on plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
caused by the [IOLA] Rule, we need not consider whether the [IOLA] program
serves a compelling state interest.").
182 Id. ("The process by which the [IOLA] program collects and uses the
accrued interest does not affect the plaintiffs' funds ... nor does it require any
other expenditures or efforts by the plaintiffs. Put simply, the plaintiffs have not
been compelled ... to contribute money to the [IOLA] program.").
183 Id. at 968.
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IV THE PROFESSIONAL CODES
The legal community has always found the ABA's ethical codes
to be very important.'84 From the early 1900's to the late 1960's,
the formal stance on issues in legal ethics was embodied in the
ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics. 185 Due to the legal commu-
nity's growing dissatisfaction with the Canons, a special committee
was formed to draft an updated and revised version.186 The new
version, the Code of Professional Responsibility, was adopted by
the ABA in 1969.187 By 1980 nearly every state had followed the
ABA in adopting the CPR.' But only eight years after the ABA
adopted the CPR, the ABA commissioned another committee to
recommend additional revisions. 89 This second committee, called
the "Kutak Commission,"' 9° found that major revisions were
needed.' 9' After substantially rewriting and reorganizing the CPR,
the ABA adopted the revised version called the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 192 Today, approximately "forty jurisdictions
114 STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS xxi (1997) (stating that "the most important ethical
codes for lawyers are those promulgated by the [ABA]").
185 See id. at xxi, 421.
186 Id. (discussing the appointing of a "Special Committee on the Evaluation
of Ethical Standards (the 'Wright Committee')," which was instructed to "study
the Canons," which ultimately drafted a new code which was then adopted by the
ABA).
187 Id.
181 Id. at xxii ("Within a few years, every state had adopted the new Code
in some form. States varied somewhat in their adoptions, changing a word here
or a sentence there, but most of the variations were modest.").
189 Id. at xxii, 3.
19 Id. at xxii ("That commission soon became known as the Kutak
Commission, after Robert J. Kutak, an energetic and visionary lawyer from
Omaha, Nebraska, who chaired the commission until his death in early 1983.").
191 Id.
1' Id. ("Between 1979 and 1982, the Kutak Commission circulated four
major drafts [which] after significant revisions... [were] formally adopted on
August 3, 1983.").
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have adopted substantial proportions of the [MRPC]."' 93 Of the
"15 states [that] retain the ... [CPR,]' 94 New York is one. 95
Because of the recognized importance of the Professional
Codes,' 96 the Circuit Court decisions concerning IOLA programs
take on heightened meaning.' 97 As discussed above, the First and
Eleventh Circuits both upheld their respective states' IOLA
programs.'98 While the courts did not involve the ABA's ethical
rules, they were implicitly affirmed by upholding the IOLA
programs which serve the legal needs of individuals that are unable
to afford them.'99
Texas' District Court also upheld the IOLA program2" but
the effect on the ethical rules was different than the implicit
affirmance of the First and Eleventh Circuit Courts. In its decision,
the District Court "decline[d] to address" the ethical implications
of the IOLA program.2"' Therefore, while upholding the IOLA
193 Id.
194 Id. at 421.
9 Id. at 809 ("The New York Code... is now codified at Part 1200 of the
joint rules of the Appellate Divisions."). Other states that have rejected the
MRPC include California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont. Id. at xxii.
196 See id. (explaining that the Professional Codes have always been
considered important by the legal community).
" See WLF, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (making no mention of the ethical
implications and not commenting on the district court's decision to not address
them); Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993) (making no
.reference whatsoever to the ethical implications); Cone v. State Bar of Florida,
819 F.2d 1002 (11 th Cir. 1987) (same); Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp.
1, 11 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (declining to address the "ethicalimplications" presented
by the scrutiny of a program whose express objective is to provide funds to law-
related public services).
'9' For a discussion of the First and Eleventh Circuits' decisions upholding
the IOLA programs, see supra Part III.
19 See generally Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (making no
reference to ethical implications and implicitly affirming the ABA's ethical rules
that Texas has adopted); Cone, 819 F.2d 1002 (adopting an IOLA program but
not making any reference to ethical implications and implicitly affirming the
ABA's ethical rules that Florida has adopted).
200 See Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at 11.
20' Id. ("The Court declines to address the expressed social, political or
public policy concerns related to the current operational procedures of the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation as it administers the [IOLA] program.
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program, which furthers the important objective of the ABA ethical
rules, the court's decision was not as supportive of the ethical rules
as that of the other circuits, which while not mentioning the ethical
rules, did not "decline to address" them either.20 2 Weakening the
ethical rules' effect on the legitimacy of IOLA programs even
further, the Fifth Circuit refused to uphold the Texas IOLA
program 203 without even mentioning the ethical implications. The
court's clear disapproval of the program was yet another severe
blow to the ethical rules. While the Supreme Court has already
heard arguments on the issue, it has not yet reached a decision.20 4
Hopefully, the words of Judge Benavides, in his dissenting opinion
opposing the denial of the petition for rehearing the issues in WLF,
will convince the Supreme Court that ethical implications are
important and need to be addressed.0 5 It is quite possible, how-
ever, that the express ethical objectives will not be considered.
Alleviation of these concerns rests with Texas attorneys ... the state bar...
[and] elected public officials.") (emphasis added).
202 See generally id.; see Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 962
(upholding IOLA while not claiming to not address the ethical implications);
Cone, 819 F.2d at 1002 (same).
203 See WLF, 94 F.3d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1996).
204 Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 117 S. Ct. 2535 (1997) (certiorari
granted and issue pending); Coleman, supra, note 10, at 1 (stating that arguments
were scheduled for January 13, 1998).
205 Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 106
F.3d 640, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1997). The judge, joined by three other judges, wrote:
This decision [to deny a rehearing in this case] is an important one
because it contradicts every other court in the country that has
addressed this issue, including two of our sister circuits and a large
number of state appellate courts.. . . [T]his case poses an unwarranted
threat to a primary source of funding for public interest legal organiza-
tions in this circuit at a time when these organizations are already
struggling for their lives financially.
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A. The ABA's MRPC
The MRPC is "intended to serve the national framework for
implementation of standards of professional conduct." 20 6 In
setting out to accomplish this noble goal, the Preamble states that:
A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the adminis-
tration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and some-
times persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional
time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should
aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives.., in
the public interest.0 7
The Preamble also declares that "a lawyer should strive . .. to
improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal
profession's ideals of public service. 2 0 ' These ideals are "a
lawyer's responsibilities" and form the framework for the ABA's
MRPC, especially as they pertain to the provision of legal services
to those that cannot afford them on their own.2 9 A lawyer is "a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice" and "play[s] a vital role in the preservation of society. 210
Therefore, when "[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct [are] ...
properly applied, [they] serve to define that relationship."2"' As
is made clear from the Preamble, lawyers are not only to be aware
of the downfalls of the legal system, but are to take affirmative
steps to aid those that are in need of legal assistance.212
The MRPC explains a lawyer's duty in the sphere of public
service through its various Article Six rules.2  First, a lawyer is
206 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction
(1997).
207 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997) [hereinafter
MRPC Preamble].
208 Id.
209 Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1997).
210 MRPC Preamble.
211 Id.
212 See id.
213 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Article 6 (1997)
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encouraged to give professional time to serve the public.2 14 In
addition, a lawyer is asked to take part in improving the legal
system and to give financial support to groups whose goal is to
provide legal services to people who cannot afford them.215 The
Comment to the MIRPC's Rule 6.1 clearly establishes the policy
that lawyers are to strive to help those that cannot afford to help
themselves by either providing services or finances to groups that
can provide the legal assistance that people need.216 The Com-
ment also states that because individual efforts are not enough to
satisfy this need, "it has been necessary... to institute additional
programs to provide legal services.""2 7
Clearly, IOLA is a program that embodies the expressed goals
of the MRPC. 218 The express goal of providing "financial sup-
port" is satisfied when a lawyer "voluntarily contributes" through
219participation in an IOLA program. IOLA would also satisfy the
MiRPC's goal of providing law-related public service because it
qualifies as an "additional program to provide legal services.' '22°
(discussing a lawyer's duty in the public service).
214 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1997) ("A lawyer
should aspire to render at least (50) hours" per year of legal assistance to those
in need) [hereinafter MRPC Rule 6.1].
215 Id. MRPC Rule 6.1(b)(3) provides that a lawyer should "participat[e] in
activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. In
addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support for organiza-
tions that provide legal services to persons of limited means."
216 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 Cmt. (1997)
[hereinafter MRPC Rule 6.1 Crnt.]. The Comment states:
Every lawyer ... has a responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay .... Because the provision of pro bono services is a
professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of
each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible
for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer
may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial
support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of
limited means.
Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See generally MRPC Rule 6.1.
220 See generally MRPC Rule 6.1 Cmt.
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With such uncontrovertible evidence that the MRPC considers
providing legal services to those that cannot afford it as a high
priority and main objective, it is clear what an obstacle the Fifth
Circuit's decision is to carrying out and reaching this goal. The
IOLA program only seeks to effectuate these noble goals and a
Supreme Court decision upholding the Fifth Circuit will only result
in decreasing any incentive a lawyer may have in easing the burden
of a poor person trying to obtain legal assistance.
B. The NYSBA's CPR
The NYSBA has not adopted the ABA's MRPC but instead has
retained the ABA's previous ethical rules, the CPR.22' Nonethe-
less, New York places the same importance on its ethical rules as
the ABA places on the MRPC.222 Moreover, the text of the CPR
is as indicative of the goals and obligations of a lawyer to provide
law-related public services as the ABA's MRPC. 23
In its Preamble, the CPR states that it hopes to guide lawyers
by the principles set forth in its text.224 This principle is restated
in the Preliminary Statement. 225 The body of the CPR spells out
the goals in express language. Canon One establishes that the first
and foremost goal of the CPR is that a "lawyer should assist in
maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profes-
sion. "226 This means that it is the obligation of a lawyer to
provide legal services to "every person in our society. ,227
221 GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 184, at 421 (stating that New York has
retained the CPR as the state's ethical code).
222 GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 184, at 421 (finding the CPR as important
as the MRPC).
223 See CPR Preamble, Preliminary Statement (1996) [hereinafter CPR
Preliminary Statement].
224 See MRPC Preamble.
225 See CPR Preliminary Statement.
226 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1996).
227 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1996) ("A
basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in
our society should have ready access to the independent professional services of
a lawyer ...... ") [hereinafter CPR EC 1-1].
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Following the clear goal of the first Canon, Canon Two states
that "a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty
to make legal counsel available., 228  This direct affirmance of
EC229 1-1 shows how important the goal of providing legal
services to the poor is to the NYSBA. Furthermore, it is the
affirmative duty of the lawyer to "facilitate the process of...
making legal services fully available."'23 EC 2-16 states that a
lawyer may fulfill this responsibility through the financial support
of organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited
means. 23  Canon Two and its "ethical considerations" clearly
define their goals and a lawyer's obligations as that of providing
legal services to those that cannot afford it. One way of doing this,
as the CPR states, is through financial support of groups that
provide these services. Clearly IOLA fulfills this goal.232
For those who remain unconvinced that IOLA fulfills the goal,
the CPR implicitly states in Canon Eight that IOLA is indeed
necessary.233 Canon Eight provides that continual efforts are
needed to "maintain and improve our legal system., 234 In doing
so a lawyer is to act affirmatively in aiding programs that improve
228 Id. at Canon 2 (1996).
229 "EC" is short for "Ethical Considerations." These are described as
"aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles
upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations." CPR
Preliminary Statement. Disciplinary Rules, commonly referred to as "DR," differ
from Ethical Considerations in that they are "mandatory in character... [and]
state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
230 Id. at EC 2-1.
231 Id. at EC 2-16 ("The legal profession cannot remain a viable force in
fulfilling its role in our society unless its members receive adequate compensa-
tion for services rendered ... [therefore,] lawyers should support and participate
in ethical activities designed to achieve that objective.") [hereinafter CPR EC 2-
16].
232 For an explanation of the concept of the IOLA program and how it
fulfills its goals of providing legal services to those that cannot afford them on
their own, see supra Part I.A.
233 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1996)
(stating "a lawyer should assist in improving the legal system").
234 Id. at EC 8-1.
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the provision of legal assistance to those that need it.235 Without
these obligations the legal system ignores those in need of legal
assistance. Therefore, IOLA is needed and encouraged by the
provisions of the CPR.
C. Other Support for IOLA
In 1982, in response to the numerous states' drives toward
implementing IOLA programs, the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("the Committee") issued a formal
opinion addressing, inter alia, the question of whether lawyers were
ethically permitted to take part in the IOLA programs. 36 At the
time this formal opinion was issued, the ABA followed the CPR,
but has since revamped its ethical rules into the MRPC. 237 The
Formal Opinion of the Committee, therefore, focused on the CPR.
Because the Professional Codes' goals are substantially the
same,23 8 and no new formal opinion has been issued, the Commit-
tee's opinion applies to the MRPC as well as the CPR.239 While
the Committee's opinion is not binding, but only advisory, on
lawyers, it is strongly persuasive authority on the duties of lawyers
and the ethicality of the IOLA program.240
235 Id. ("[L]awyers are especially qualified to. . . initiate corrective measures
.. . to improve the [legal] system.").
236 ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
348 (1982) [hereinafter Formal Op. 348]. The opinion stated:
Programs are being developed in a number of states to provide
financial support for law-related public service projects from interest
earned on lawyers' trust accounts in depositary institutions. The
Committee has been asked for its opinion on whether it is ethically
permissible for lawyers to participate in these programs.
Id.
237 For explanation of the ABA adoption of the CPR, their subsequent
revision and adoption of the MRPC and New York State's continued following
of the CPR, see supra Part IV.
238 The goals of the Professional Codes are to strive to aid those that cannot
afford legal services and to participate in activities to improve the law. See
MRPC Preamble; CPR Preliminary Statement.
239 See Formal Op. 348., supra note 236.
240 See Amanda French Palmer, Comment, A Critique of Interest on
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In answering the question of whether "lawyers may participate
in programs using law-related public service projects," the
Committee's opinion states that the Professional Codes do not
explicitly make it permissible for lawyers to participate in IOLA
programs.24' The Committee did, however, recognize two practi-
cal benefits of IOLA programs: 1) shifting economic benefits from
the banks to the law-related public interest organizations,2 42 and
2) creating income where there would be none without the pro-
gram.243 The Committee concluded that as long as a state's courts
or legislature allows an IOLA program, a lawyer's participation in
the program was ethical.244
Even while claiming that the Professional Codes did not clearly
establish whether participation was ethically allowed, the Commit-
tee's opinion later states that they recognized the Professional
Codes' clearly established goal of assisting in improving the legal
system.245 The opinion continued to state that the goals of the
Professional Codes are "advanced when a lawyer participates in a
program which puts idle funds to law-related public uses., 246
Thus, the ABA's formal opinion clearly shows that lawyer
participation in IOLA programs is not only ethically permissible
but also directly meets the goals of assisting in improving the legal
system, and helps to provide legal services to those that, if not for
Lawyers' Trust Accounts Programs, 44 LA. L. REV. 999, 1000 nn. 12-13 (1984)
(stating that the Committee's advisory role is just that, advisory, and not binding
authority).
241 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236.
242 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236 ("The practical effect of implementing
these programs is to shift a part of the economic benefit from depository
institutions to tax-exempt organizations.").
243 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236.
244 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236 ("[A]ssuming that either a court or a
legislature has authorized a program.., participation in the program by lawyers
is ethical.").
245 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236 ("Canon 8 of the Model Code [of
Professional Responsibility] says '[a] lawyer should assist in improving the legal
system."'). See also MRPC Rule 6.1 (stating that a lawyer has a responsibility
to aid in the improvement of the legal system).
246 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236.
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the IOLA program, could not otherwise afford them.247 There-
fore, the Committee's opinion supports the conclusion that IOLA
programs meet the goals of the Professional Codes.248
CONCLUSION
The continued existence of a free and democratic society
depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is
based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the
dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason
for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes
justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity
of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it,
individual rights become subject to unrestrained power,
respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government
is impossible.249
While the Fifth Circuit and its predecessors purport not to
consider the 'ethical implications in deciding whether IOLA
programs are valid, the Professional Codes have clearly made them
a part of what they consider some of its principles to be. This, as
stated in the previous sections, is the provision of legal services to
those that cannot afford them on their own. Both Professional
Codes also state that without lawyers assisting in the provision of
these services, the profession cannot retain its nobility and integrity,
and cannot continue to justify its important role in preserving
society."5 By overlooking the Professional Codes' clearly expres-
sed aspirations for the profession, the Fifth Circuit has, at best,
amended the Professional Codes and eliminated the references to
providing law-related public assistance. At worst, its decision has
established the precedent that the Professional Codes are nothing
more than a proposal and mean nothing in the eyes of the law.
247 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236.
248 Formal Op. 348, supra note 236.
249 CPR Preamble.
210 See MRPC Preamble; MRPC Rule 6.1; CPR Preamble; CPR EC 1-1.
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